For example, whether mind is exclusive to humans, possessed also by some or all animals, by all living things, whether it is a strictly definable characteristic at all, or whether mind can also be a property of some types of human-made machines. Another question concerns which types of beings are capable of having minds. Modern views often center around physicalism and functionalism, which hold that the mind is roughly identical with the brain or reducible to physical phenomena such as neuronal activity though dualism and idealism continue to have many supporters. Traditional viewpoints included dualism and idealism, which consider the mind to be non-physical. The issue of the nature of this contrast and specifically the relation between mind and brain is called the mind-body problem. Mind or mentality is usually contrasted with body, matter or physicality. Central questions for the study of mind, like whether other entities besides humans have minds or how the relation between body and mind is to be conceived, are strongly influenced by the choice of one's definition. For behaviorism, whether an entity has a mind only depends on how it behaves in response to external stimuli while functionalism defines mental states in terms of the causal roles they play. According to intentionality-based approaches, the power to refer to objects and to represent the world is the mark of the mental. Consciousness-based approaches give primacy to the conscious mind and allow unconscious mental phenomena as part of the mind only to the extent that they stand in the right relation to the conscious mind. Epistemic definitions focus on the privileged epistemic access the subject has to these states. Various competing definitions of the exact nature of the mind or mentality have been proposed. Minds were traditionally understood as substances but it is more common in the contemporary perspective to conceive them as properties or capacities possessed by humans and higher animals. Important distinctions group them according to whether they are sensory, propositional, intentional, conscious, or occurrent. Various overlapping classifications of mental phenomena have been proposed. They are responsible for various mental phenomena, like perception, pain experience, belief, desire, intention, and emotion. These faculties include thought, imagination, memory, will, and sensation. Often the term is also identified with the phenomena themselves. The mind is the set of faculties responsible for all mental phenomena. Phrenology was among the first attempts to correlate mental functions with specific parts of the brain. Rounding out the show’s cast are Amy Sedaris (“The Mandalorian,” “At Home With Amy Sedaris”) as Harleen’s Aunt Rose Andre Royo (“Empire,” “The Spectacular Now”) as Arnold Wesker aka The Ventriloquist Stephen Root (“Barry,” “King of the Hill”) as Harleen’s boss, Grunfeld Fred Melamed (“Barry,” “WandaVision”) as Harleen’s co-worker Bob Mary Holland (“Senior Year”) as Margaret Pye aka Magpie and Elias Koteas (“Goliath,” “Chicago PD”) as Harleen’s father Nicky Quinzel.A phrenological mapping of the brain. So when she meets “Patient J,” a magnetic inmate able to manipulate everyone but her, Harleen makes a fateful decision: to use her relationship with The Joker to get what she wants, leading both of them down a dangerous path that will change them, Bruce Wayne - and Gotham City - forever. Pushed to her breaking point, Harleen is tired of playing by the rules. But her dad is sick, and in need of an expensive, life-saving operation she can’t afford. Harleen Quinzel, she’s fresh out of grad school, a new psychologist at Arkham Asylum who’s determined to help the patients her colleagues have written off. In “Harley Quinn and The Joker,” when we meet Dr. Justin Hartley (“This Is Us”) co-stars as Bruce Wayne/Batman. Starring Ricci (“Yellowjackets,” “Wednesday,” “The Matrix Resurrections”) and Billy Magnussen (“No Time to Die,” “Made for Love”), the series tells a new origin story from the perspective of Harley Quinn herself.
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